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"OTHER ACTS" EVIDENCE
Paul C. Giannelli
Professor of Law
Case Western Reserve University
Ohio Evidence Rule 404(8), which is identical to
Federal Rule 404(b), governs the admissibility of evidence of "other acts." It reads: "Evidence of other
crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove
the character of a person in order to show that he
acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident."
The admission of "other acts" as evidence in criminal cases is commonplace. Unfortunately, the erroneous admission of "other acts" is also commonplace. One commentator has written that "uncharged misconduct is perhaps the most
misunderstood area of evidence law." E. lmwinkelried, Uncharged Misconduct Evidence viii
(1984). In his survey of the cases on this issue, Dean
Wigmore found "bewildering variances of rulings in
the different jurisdictions and even in the same
jurisdiction .... " 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence§ 302, at 246
(Chadbourn rev. 1979). This state of confusion is also
found in the Ohio cases. Prior to the adoption of the
Ohio rule, evidence of "other acts" was governed by
RC 2945.59, the so-called "Similar Acts" statute. In a
1975 article, two authors-one a prosecutor and the
other a defense counsel-commented on that
statute: "The statute has been a source of major confusion to attorneys and judges alike-even the title
itself being subject to some inherent misunderstanding." Herbert & Mount, Ohio's "Similar Acts
Statute": Its Uses and Abuses, 9 Akron L. Rev. 301
(1975).
Although the adoption of the Federal Rules offered
an opportunity to clarify the law in this area, the
drafters did not take advantage of that opportunity.
Rule 404(b) did not clarify the law; instead, it codified
the existing confusion. The fact that Federal Rule
404(b) is the most litigated of all the Federal Rules of
Evidence indicates as much. See 2 J. Weinstein & M.
Berger, Weinstein's Evidence 404-47 (1982) ("more
decisions than occasioned by any other single rule").
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Professors Wright and Graham accurately describe
the effect of the rule in their treatise. They wrote:
"Rule 404(b) is a good illustration of Wigmore's Rule
of Codification: the 'always conceded principle
should frequently be found solemnly enacted, while
the important controversies ... are ignored and left
without solution.'" 22 C. Wright & K. Graham,
Federal Practice and Procedure 427 (1978).
This article examines Rule 404(8). Since, however,
Rule 404(8) cannot be understood without an appreciation of Rule 404(A), which governs the admissibility of character evidence, the latter rule is discussed
first.
CHARACTER EVIDENCE
Rule 404(A) governs character evidence, which is
also known as propensity or disposition evidence.
The first part of the rule provides: "Evidence of a person's character or a trait of his character is not
admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted
in conformity therewith on a particular occasion .... "
This provision concerns only the circumstantial use
of character. It involves an inference that someone
with a particular character trait will act in conformity
with that trait on a particular occasion. For example,
it could be inferred that a person with a larcenous
character acts in conformity with that character and
steals. Consequently, when charged with a theft offense, that person's character is circumstantially
probative.
The circumstantial use of character, then, is not
prohibited because it has no probative value. As
Justice Jackson wrote: "The inquiry is not rejected
because character is irrelevant; on the contrary, it is
said to weigh too much with the jury and to so overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a bad general
record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend
against a particular charge." Michelson v. U.S., 335
U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948). For example, a three-time
rapist is a good suspect in a rape case; nevertheless,
such evidence is inadmissible at trial. It is excluded
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because the accused should be convicted for what
he did, not for what he is. The Ohio Supreme Court
has identified the following dangers associated with
character evidence:

672 F.2d 1248, 1253 (5th Cir. 1982).
Methods of Proving Character
The exceptions in Rule 404(A) specify only when
character evidence may be admitted. That rule does
not specify the methods of proving character. Rule
405(A) governs the methods of proof. It reads: "Reputation or Opinion. In all cases in which evidence of
character or a trait of character of a person is admiss_ible, proof m~y be n:ade by testimony as to reputation or by test1mony 1n the form of an opinion. On
cross-examination, inquiry is allowable into relevant
specific instances of conduct." Thus, a character
witness may testify about his personal opinion of the
defendant's character in addition to the defendant's
reputation in the community. This rule represents a
change in the common law, which permitted the use
of reputation, but not opinion, evidence to prove
character.
What is not so obvious is that this change may also permit expert opinion testimony concerning a defendant's character. The Advisory Committee's Note
to :e~eral Rule 405 refers to the "opinion of the psychlatnst based upon examination and testing." The
courts, however, are divided over the admissibility of
this type of evidence. In U.S. v. MacDonald, 688 F.2d
224, 227-28 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 426
(1983), the court held that it was not an abuse of disc~etion to exclude character testimony by a psychiatnst that the defendant possessed a personality configuration inconsistent with the outrageous and
senseless murders of his family for which he was
charged. In contrast, the court in U.S. v. Staggs, 553
F.2d 1073, 1075-76 (7th Cir. 1977), held that a psychologist's testimony concerning the nonaggressive
character of the defendant should have been admitted.
In addition to introducing its own character witnesse_s to rebut defense character evidence, the prosecution may cross-examine defense character witnesses. The theory for permitting this type of crossexamination is that the prosecution has the right to
test the basis for the character witness' testimony.
For example, a defense character witness who is
unaware of a defendant's prior arrests and convictions would not appear to be very informed about the
defendant's reputation. If that person is informed but
ignores such information, the jury may question the
standards used in arriving at the conclusion that the
accused has a good reputation. In Michelson Justice
Jackson gave the following example:

(1) The overstrong tendency to believe the defendant
guilty of the charge merely because he is a person likely
to do such acts; (2) the tendency to condemn not because he is believed guilty of the present charge but because he had escaped punishment from other offenses·
(3) the injustice of attacking one who is not prepared to'
demonstra~e the !3-ttacking evidence is fabricated; and (4)
the confus1on of Issues which might result from bringing
in evidence of other crimes. State v. Curry, 43 Ohio St.2d
66, 68, 330 N.E.2d 720, 723 (1975).

Despite these dangers, both the common law and
Rule 404(A) recognize several exceptions .to the general prohibition against the admissibility of character
evidence. Rule 404(A) contains three exceptions: (1)
the character of the accused, (2) the character of the
victim, and (3) the character of witnesses.
Exception: Character of Accused
Rule 404(A)(1) provides: "Evidence of a pertinent
trait of hi_s character offered by an accused, or by the
prosecution to rebut the same is admissible; however, in prosecutions for rape, gross sexual imposition, and prostitution, the exceptions provided by the
statute enacted by the General AEsembly are applicable." This provision, which generally codifies the
common law rule, has caused few problems. Nevertheless, two issues are worth noting.
First, the exception permits only evidence of a
"pertinent character trait." In an assault case, nonviolent character is the pertinent trait. In a theft case
honest character is the pertinent trait. The rule ap- '
peared to preclude the admissibility of general character traits, such as law-abiding character. Several
cases, however, have held otherwise. U.S. v. Angelini,
678 F.2d 380, 382 (1st Cir. 1982) (character evidence
that a defendant is a law-abiding person is admissible as a pertinent character trait); U.S. v. Hewitt,
634 F.2d277, 280 (5th Cir. 1981) (character evidence
that defendant was a law-abiding citizen is admissible). These cases do not necessarily favor the defense. The prosecution's response, either on crossexamination or through rebuttal witnesses, to the defendant's character evidence is restricted to the
character trait offered by the defense. If the defense
offers evidence of honest character, the prosecution
may not respond with evidence of violent character.
If, however, the defense offers evidence of lawabiding character, the prosecution may respond with
evidence of general criminal character. Such
evidence is relevant because it responds to the
defendant's evidence.
Second, the term "accused" appears in the exception. This would seem to limit the exception to a
criminal defendant. Thus, the exception would not
apply in civil cases. There are a few cases however
that have held otherwise. Carson v. Polley: 689 F.2d'
562, 575 (5th Cir. 1982) (in a civil case, when the
nature of the central issue is close to one of a criminal nature, character traits are admissible and Rule
404(a) applies); Crumpton v. Confederation Life Ins.,

A classic example in the books is a character witness in
a trial for murder. She testified she grew up with the defend~nt, knew his reputation for peace and quiet, and
that 1t was good. On cross-examination she was asked if
she had heard that the defendant had shot anybody and
if so, how many. She answered, "three or four," and gav~
the names of two but could not recall the names of the
others. She still insisted, however, that he was of "good
character." The jury seems to have valued her information more highly than her judgment [and convicted]. Michelson v. U.S., 335 U.S. 469,479 n.16 (1948).

Although this form of cross-examination is permitted, it is fraught with the danger of prejudice. Conse2
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quently, the courts have placed limitations on its
use. For example, in U.S. v. Glass, 709 F.2d 669, 673
(11th Cir. 1983), the court held that the prosecution
may inquire into specific instances of the defendant's conduct on cross-examination only if (1) there
is a good faith factual basis for the question and (2)
the incidents inquired about are relevant to the
character traits involved at trial. See also U.S. v.
Reed, 700 F.2d 638, 644-45 (11th Cir. 1983) (embezzlement defendant, who presents character witnesses
on the issue of his truth and veracity, may not be
cross-examined about possession of marijuana).
One commentator has proposed the following procedure: "As a precondition to cross-examination
about other wrongs, the prosecutor should reveal,
outside the hearing of the jury, what his basis is for
believing in the rumors or incidents he proposes to
ask about. The court should then determine whether
there is a substantial basis for the cross-exam ina- ·
tion." C. McCormick, Evidence 569-70 (3d ed. 1984). A
number of courts require or recommend this procedure. See U.S. v. Reese, 568 F.2d 1246, 1249 (6th Cir.
1977); U.S. v. Duke, 492 F.2d 693, 694 (5th Cir. 1974);
U.S. v. Lewis, 482 F.2d 632, 639 (D.C. Cir. 1973);

Although the evidence is relevant to self-defense,
admissibility is not governed by Rule 404. Rule
404(A)(2) governs only the circumstantial use of character evidence and in this context involves only one
element of a self-defense claim: the issue of who
was the first aggressor. The theory of admissibility is
that a victim with a violent character acts in conformity with that character and this evidence is probative
on the first aggressor issue. A second (and distinct)
issue in a self-defense claim is whether the defendant acted with an honest and reasonable belief that
his life was in danger when he used deadly force.
This issue does not involve the circumstantial use of
character. Any evidence which influenced the defendant's mental state, such as his belief that the victim
had a violent character, is admissible. It was this
issue which was involved in Smith. See also Government of Virgin Islands v. Carino, 631 F.2d 226, 229 (3d
Cir. 1980); C. McCormick, Evidence 572 n.3 (3d ed.
1984) ("Used for this purpose, the evidence does not
transgress the policy against employing character
evidence to show conduct.").
The second type of case in which a victim's character may be relevant is a rape or gross sexual imposition prosecution. As Rule 404(A)(2) provides, admissibility of character evidence in these cases is controlled by the rape shield statute. RC 2907.02(D); RC
2907.05(D). Shield laws are often attacked on constitutional grounds. See Letwin, "Unchaste Character,"
Ideology, and the California Rape Evidence Laws, 54
S. Cal. L. Rev. 35 (1980); Tanford & Bocchino, Rape
Victim Shield Laws and the Sixth Amendment, 128 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 544 (1980); Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's
Tribulations: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77
Colum. L. Rev. 1, 39-69 (1977).
For the most part, such attacks have failed. See
Doe v. U.S., 666 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1981); Annat., 1
ALR4th 283 (1980). Nevertheless, the circumstances
of a particular case may support such an argument.
Indeed, the federal shield law explicitly recognizes
this possibility. See Fed. R. Evid. 412(b)(1) (admissibility may be "constitutionally required"). State v.
Jalo, 27 Or. App. 845, 850-51, 557 P.2d 1359, 1362
(1976), is illustrative. In Jalo the defendant denied
that he had sexual intercourse with the complainant.
The court held it was error to exclude evidence that
the complainant had had sexual relations with the
defendant's son and others, which facts had become
known to the defendant and he had told the complainant that he would notify her parents. Application
of the shield law in this case precluded the defendant from establishing the complainant's motive to
falsely accuse him.

Exception: Character of Victim
The second exception to the general prohibition
against the use of character evidence is found in
Rule 404(A)(2). It reads: "Evidence of a pertinent trait
of character of the victim of the crime offered by an
accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or
evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the
victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case
to rebut evidence that the victim was the first aggressor is admissible; however, in prosecutions for rape,
gross sexual imposition, and prostitution, the exceptions provided by statute enacted by the General
Assembly are applicable." As with the first exception, only opinion and reputation evidence is permitted. Rule 405(a).
Generally, two types of cases come within this exception. In homicide and assault cases, the accused
may introduce evidence of the victim's violent character to support a claim of self-defense. This evidence is offered to show that the victim was the first
aggressor. In homicide cases, a special rule applies.
The prosecution need not wait for the defense to offer character evidence on the first aggressor issue;
any evidence on this issue, such as the defendant's
testimony that the victim was the first aggressor,
triggers the prosecution's right to respond with
evidence of the victim's nonviolent character.
The principal problem with this rule is that it is frequently misapplied. For example, in State v. Smith,
10 Ohio App.3d 99, 101,460 N.E.2d 693,697 (1983),
the court held that the victim's admission to the defendant that he had killed a person, her personal
knowledge of the victim's violent attacks on others,
and her knowledge through hearsay that the deceased had committed an unprovoked act of violence
upon another were relevent to the defendant's belief
that she was in imminent danger of death. The court
cited Rule 404(A)(2) to support its decision.

Exception: Character of Witnesses
The third exception to the general prohibition
against character evidence involves the character of
a witness. Rule 404(A)(3) contains a cross-reference
to the impeachment rules relating to character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness. See Rule 609 (impeachment by prior convictions); Rule 608(A) (impeachment by reputation or opinion); Rule 608(B) impeachment by prior acts not resulting in a conviction).
3
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Subsequent acts
Although "other acts" evidence is sometimes referred to as "prior crimes" evidence, the relevant act
may have occurred after the charged offense. In
other words, subsequent acts may also be admissible. See U.S. v. Riley, 657 F.2d 1377, 1388 (8th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 742 (1983); State v.
Wilson, 8 Ohio App.3d 216, 219,456 N.E.2d 1287, 1291
(1982) (evidence of subsequent unlawful importuning
admitted in rape case). For example, if a robbery defendant threatens a witness the day before trial, evidence of the threat may be admissible to show consciousness of guilt, even though it occurred after the
charged offense.

RULE 404(B)
As mentioned at the beginning of this article, Rule
404(B) governs the admissibility of "other acts" evidence. A close analysis of the rule is critical. The rule
contains two sentences. The first sentence provides:
"Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove' the character of a person in order
to show that he acted in conformity therewith." This
sentence is redundant. Rule 404(A) already prohibits
the circumstantial use of character. The second sentence provides that such evidence "may, however, be
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident."
In one sense, this sentence is unnecessary. Rule
404(A) prohibits only the circumstantial use of
character. If evidence is offered for some other purpose, Rule 404(A) simply does not apply. The federal
drafters, of course, were aware of this. They included
Rule 404(b) as a rule of clarification, intending it to
highlight the limited scope of Rule 404(a).
','!"
.,
i;

Noncriminal conduct
By its own terms, Rule 404(B) is not limited to
other crimes. It includes other acts and wrongs that
are not criminal. U.S. v. Rubio-Gonzalez, 674 F.2d
1067, 1075 (5th Cir. 1982) ("Rule 404(b) authorizes the
admission of prior 'acts' as well as 'crimes' and
'wrongs.'"). This is another reason why the term
"prior crimes" evidence is misleading. As an example, consider a murder case in which the prosecution's theory is that the defendant killed the victim
because he wanted to marry the victim's wife. Proof
of an affair between the defendant and the victim's
wife-the "other act"-may be admissible to establish motive.

Before discussing the analysis required by Rule
404 (B), several preliminary issues deserve attention.
Civil cases
"Other acts" evidence is typically used in criminal
cases, and thus it is not surprising that the Ohio Similar Acts statute, RC 2945.59, was placed in the criminal code. Rule 404(B), however, applies in civil as
well as criminal cases. See Doe v. New York City
Dep't of Social Services, 649 F.2d 134, 147 (2d Cir.
1981) (civil rights action), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 195
(1983); Annat., 64 ALR Fed 648 (1983) (applicability of
Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) in civil cases).

Similar acts
The "other act" need not be similar to the charged
offense. This is why the term "Similar Acts" Statute
is misleading. Sometimes the other act is similar.
The robbery example mentioned above is illustrative;
it is the existence of the similarity in the distinctive
modus operandi in the prior offenses and the case at
bar which makes the "other act" relevant to prove
identity. In other cases, however, there is no similarity between the "other act" and the charged offense.
Here, the murder example mentioned above is illustrative. The "other act" is the affair with the victim's
wife; the charged offense is murder.

"Other acts" evidence offered by the accused
Rule 404(b) is typically used by the prosecution.
For instance, if the defendant employs a distinctive
modus operandi in a series of robberies but is charged with only the last robbery, the prosecution may offer evidence that the defendant committed the prior
robberies using this distinctive modus operandi.
Proof that the same modus operandi was used in the
charged offense raises the inference that the defendant also committed that crime. Thus, the "other
act" evidence is· relevant to establish identity.
The probative value of modus operandi to show
identity, however, is the same when it is offered by
the defense. In this context, the defense is attempting to show that another person, using a distinctive
modus operandi, committed the earlier robberies
and, since the same m.o. was used in the charged offense, that person also committed it. See State v.
Garfole, 76 N.J. 445, 388 A.2d 587 (1978); State v.
Bock, 229 Minn. 449, 39 N.W.2d 887 (1949). Indeed,
the argument for admissibility is stronger when
"other acts" evidence is offered by the defendant
because the risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant
is not present. See U.S. v. Aboumoussallem, 726 F.2d
906, 911 (2d Cir. 1984) (standard of admissibility when
other acts are offered by the defense is not as restrictive as in cases in which the evidence is off-ered
by the prosecution).

Statute of Limitations
Several cases have involved the admissibility of
evidence of prior crimes for which the statute of limitations has expired. The courts·have held that this
fact does not preclude admission of the evidence.
U.S. v. DeFiore, 720 F.2d 757, 764 (2d Cir. 1983); U.S. v.
Means, 695 F.2d 811,816 (5th Cir. 1983); U.S. v.
Blosser, 440 F.2d 697,699 (10th Cir. 1971). These
courts have found that the reasons for enacting a
statute of limitations are inapplicable in this context:
The statute of limitations is a defense to prosecution,
not a rule of evidence. Therefore, once prosecution is
timely instituted, the statute of limitations has no bearing on the admissibility of evidence. It would be a bizarre
result indeed if a crime properly prosecuted within the
limitations period could not be proven because an essential element, such as intent, could only be established by proof of incidents occurring outside the period.
U.S. v. Ashdown, 509 F.2d 793, 798 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 529 (1975).
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other proof and other factors appropriate for making
decisions of this kind under Rule 403." Advisory
Committee's Note, Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).
Rule 401 defines relevant evidence as "evidence
having any tendency to make the existence of any
fact that is of consequence to the determination of
the action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence." Rule 403(A) provides: "Although relevant, evidence is not admissible
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice, of confusion of the issues, or of misleading the jury." Although "other
acts" evidence may be confusing and misleading, it
is the risk of unfair prejudice that is the principal
concern-in particular, the risk that the jury will
misuse the evidence for the prohibited purpose of establishing propensity or character.

Acquittals
The federal courts are divided on the issue of
whether a prior acquittal precludes the admission of
"other acts" evidence. Compare U.S. v. Van Cleave,
599 F.2d 954, 957 (10th Cir. 1979) (evidence of another
crime is not necessarily inadmissible by the fact of
acquittal), with Albert v. Montgomery, 732 F.2d 865,
869-70 (11th Cir. 1984). U.S. v. Mespoulede, 597 F.2d
329, 334-35 (2d Cir. 1979) (evidence of prior similar
acts is not admissible when the defendant has been
acquitted of those acts by a jury); U.S. v. Keller, 624
F.2d 1154, 1157 (3d Ci r. 1980) (collateral estoppal
precludes admission of evidence of other crimes
following an acquittal). See generally Annot., 25
ALR4th 934 (1983).
The rationale for precluding the use of an "other
act" which has resulted in an acquittal is often based on constitutional considerations. The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that the Double Jeopardy
Clause encompasses the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970). Although Ashe did not involve "other acts" evidence,
some courts have extended Ashe to cover such
evidence:

Relevance other than propensity
The first step in determining the admissibility of
"other acts" evidence is identifying its relevancy or
probative value. The evidence must prove something
other than the defendant's propensity. While the prosecution will rarely admit that the evidence is being
offered to show propensity, there are a few reported
cases in which admissibility is argued on this basis.
E.g., People v. Zackowitz, 254 N.Y. 192, 172 N.E. 466
(1930) (possession of weapons offered to show
defendant was a "person criminally inclined"). In
most cases, the prosecution will offer some other
reason for admission. For example, in People v.
Tassell, 201 Cal. Rptr. 567, 679 P.2d 1 (1984), the
defendant claimed that the victim consented to an
act of oral copulation. In its case-in-chief, the prosecution introduced two prior sex offenses committed in much the same way. According to the prosecution, the evidence was offered to show a "common
plan or design." The "common plan or design" argument might have been relevant if the defendant's
identity or even perhaps intent to have intercourse
were at issue. The defendant, however, claimed consent, thus conceding identity and intent. Accordingly, the California Supreme Court commented that the
"common plan or design" rationale was "merely a
euphemism for 'disposition' " and held the evidence
inadmissible. /d. at 574, 679 P.2d 8.
Another common example involves the use of
modus operandi to prove identity. Two bank robberies with a firearm do not establish a distinctive
modus operandi. As McCormick points out: "Much
more is demanded than the mere repeated commission of crimes of the same class, such as repeated
murders, robberies or rapes. The pattern and characteristics of the crimes must be so unusual and distinctive as to be like a signature." C. McCormick, Evidence 559-60 (3d ed. 1984). One court explained it
this way: "It is apparent that the indicated inference
does not arise ... from the mere fact that the charged and uncharged offenses share certain marks of
similarity, for it may be that the marks in question
are of such common occurrence that they are shared
not only by the charged crime and defendant's prior
offenses, but also by numerous other crimes committed by persons other than defendant." People v.

[l]t is a basic tenet of our jurisprudence that once the
state has mustered its evidence against a defendant and
failed, the matter is done. In the eyes of the law the acquitted defendant is to be treated as innocent and in the
interests of fairness and finality made no more to answer for his alleged crime. It is our view that the admission into a trial of evidence of crimes of which the defendant has been acquitted prejudices and burdens the
defendant in contravention of this basic principle and is
fundamentally unfair. State v. Wakefield, 278 N.W.2d
307, 308-9 (Minn. 1979).

The counter argument is that the a-ccused is not being retried for the prior offense when only evidentiary
use is made of that offense, and that double jeopardy arises only when there is relitigation of the same
facts from the same transaction:
Offering evidence of a prior crime, for which defendant
has been acquitted, to a jury embarked on a distinct inquiry ... does not involve asking the second jury to convict defendant for the prior crime. It does not involve the
second jury contradicting the first jury, since the first
jury did not find that the defendant did not commit the
crime, only that the People had not proved that he had
beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Oliphant, 399
Mich. 472,498 n.14, 250 N.W.2d 443,454 (1976).

See generally E. lmwinkelried, Uncharged Misconduct Evidence§§ 10.03-.09 (1984).
ADMISSIBILITY
Admissibility of "other acts" evidence requires an
analysis under Rules 401 and 403. Rule 404(8) simply
says that evidence of "other acts" may be admissible. As Judge Weinstein has written: "Rule 404(b)
does not authorize automatic admission." 2 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence 404-47(1982).
~ The federal drafters also recognized that admission
if!! was not automatic: "No mechanical solution is of,_ fered. The determination must be made whether the
danger of undue prejudice outweighs the probative
value of the evidence in view of the availability of
5

be admissible to establish preparation and is probative of identity.
"Other acts" evidence is often used to show that
the accused possessed the requisite mental state fo
the charged offense, i.e. to establish the mens rea.
Two of the listed "purposes"-intent and knowledgE
-are typical mens rea elements. Moreover, absence
of mistake or accident relates to mens rea. It is simp
ly a claim that the defendant did not possess the
necessary mens rea. For example, when the defendant claims he made a mistake about the nature of a
controlled substance, he is asserting that he did not
have the requisite mens rea, i.e. knowledge that the
substance was heroin. Accordingly, his prior heroin
transactions may be admissible to show that he is
familiar with heroin and thus a mistake is unlikely.
Although not as common as the identity and mem
rea examples, "other acts" evidence may be used to
show that a crime has been committed, i.e. to establish the corpus delicti. The famous "Brides in the
Bath Case," Rex v. Smith, 11 Grim. App. 229, 84
L.J.K.B. 2153 (1915), illustrates this use of "other
acts" evidence. In that case, the defendant was accused of murdering his wife, who was found drowned in a bath tub. The prosecution introduced evidence showing that two other women who had been
married to the defendant also drowned while taking
baths. The evidence was relevant to show that the
death in the charged offense was homicidal and not
accidental. See also U.S. v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127 (4th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 979 (197 4).
In addition to identity, mens rea, and corpus delicti, there is another category of cases in which
"other acts" evidence is often found. This category
is sometimes labeled "interrelated acts" or "res
gestae." In State v. Curry, 43 Ohio St.2d 66, 330
N.E.2d 720 (1975), the Supreme Court recognized tha
there are:

Haston, 69 Cal.2d 233, 245, 70 Cal. Rptr. 419, 427, 444
P.2d 91, 99 (1968).
To avoid these traps the prose<:;ution should bear
the burden of clearly stating the relevance of "other
acts" evidence. As one court has commented, "the
prosecutor's first duty is to identify, with specificity,
the purpose for which the evidence is admissible"
and the trial court should require "a showing by the
prosecutor as to how such evidence is relevant .... "
People v. Golochowicz, 413 Mich. 298, 314-15, 319
N.W.2d 518, 523-24 (1982). Any other approach will result in what one commentator has described as the
"smorgasbord" approach to analysis of other crimes
evidence "in which the court simply serves up a long
list of permissible uses without any attempt to show
how any of them are applicable to the case at hand."
22 C. Wright & K. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure 479 (1978).
Relevancy-"other purposes"
Rule 404(B) lists a number of purposes for which
"other acts" evidence may be admitted: motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Two points
are worth noting about this list. First, the list is not
exhaustive. See State v. Wilson, 8 Ohio App.3d 216,
219, 456 N.E.2d 1287, 1290 (1982) ("a party may sometimes introduce 'other acts' evidence, although the
purpose for its admission is not enumerated in Evid
R 404(B)").
Second and more importantly, the list may be
more harmful than helpful. Many of the "purposes"
listed, such as motive, opportunity, and preparation,
are not essential elements of crimes. Accordingly, it
is not enough for the prosecution to state that the
"other acts" evidence is being offered to prove motive; the prosecution must state that motive is relevant to some essential element, such as identity.
This point is critical because, as will be discussed in
a subsequent section, identity may not be a disputed
issue in the case, and thus the need for the evidence
may be minimal while the risk of unfair prejudice
may be substantial.
One helpful commentary states that "other acts"
evidence is generally admissible on three different
ultimate issues: identity, mens rea, and corpus delicti. 22 C. Wright & K. Graham, Federal Practice and
Procedure 460 (1978).
"Other acts" evidence is often used to show that
the accused was the actor, i.e. to establish identity.
Several of the listed "purposes" of Rule 404(B) fall into this category. For example: (1) In a murder case,
evidence of the defendant's affair with the victim's
wife (the "other act") may be admitted to establish
motive and motive is probative of identity. (2) In a
murder case in which the victim was killed by ttie explosion of a bomb, evidence that the defendant had
used a bomb in a prior offense may be admissible to
establish the defendant's technical know-how with
explosives, and this capacity (opportunity) is probative of identity. (3) In a bank robbery case, evidence
that the defendant had previously stolen the car that
was later identified as the robbery getaway car may

Situations in which the "other acts" form part of the immediate background of the alleged act which forms the
foundation of the crime charged in the indictment. In
such cases, it would be virtually impossible to prove tha
the accused committed the crime charged without also
introducing evidence of the other acts. To be admissible
... the "other acts" testimony must concern events
which are inextricably related to the alleged criminal ac·
.... /d. at 73, 330 N.E.2d at 725.

There is some dispute, at ieast in the federal
cases, over whether "interrelated acts" are "other
acts" within the meaning of Federal Rule 404(b). For
example, in U.S. v. Weeks, 716 F.2d 830, 832 (11th Cir
1983), the Eleventh Circuit took the position that evidence of criminal activity other than the charged offense is not considered extrinsic evidence within thE
proscription of Rule 404(b): (1) if it is an uncharged o1
tense which arose out of the same transaction or
series of transactions as the charged offense, (2) if it
was inextricably intertwined with the evidence regar·
ding the charged offense, or (3) if it is necessary to
complete the story of the crime charged. In contrast,
the Second Circuit in U.S. v. Levy, 731 F.2d 997, 1003
(2d Cir. 1984), held that Rules 404(b) and 403 govern
the admissibility of evidence of uncharged crimes
6
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dicial impact).
One aspect of this "balancing"process deserves
special attention. Because "other acts" evidence
commonly involves the risk of unfair prejudice, many
courts have ruled that such evidence is admissible
only if the issue for which it is offered is in dispute.
For example, the Second Circuit has stated that
"other acts" evidence is "inadmissible to prove intent when that issue is not really in dispute." U.S. v.
Williams, 577 F.2d 188, 191 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 868 (1978). See also C. McCormick, Evidence 564
(3d ed. 1984) (there should be "a genuine controversy").

that are inextricably interwoven with the charged offense.
Under either view, the critical issue remains the
same: "[O]nly as much of related crimes as is neces(~ sary to r.nake comprehensible the evidence relating
to the charged crime should be admitted." 2 J.
Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence 404-61
to 62 (1982).
Relevancy-the defendant's involvement in the
"other act"
In order to establish the relevancy of "other acts"
evidence, the prosecution must also show that the
defendant committed the other act. In the distinctive
modus operandi example used earlier in this article,
evidence of the prior robberies is not relevant, no
matter how similar they are to the charged offense,
unless it can be shown that the defendant was involved in the prior robberies. The defendant's involvement need not have resulted in a conviction nor does
the prosecution have to establish his involvement by
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Ohio cases require substantial proof that the
defendant committed the other act. State v. Dick, 27
Ohio St.2d 162, 167-68,271 N.E.2d 797, 800-01 (1971);
State v. Carter, 26 Ohio St.2d 79, 82-83, 269 N.E.2d
115, 117 (1971). Most federal courts require clear and
convincing evidence. U.S. v. Gustafson, 728 F.2d
1078, 1082-83 (8th Cir. 1984); U.S. v. Kane, 726 F.2d
344, 348 (7th Cir. 1984). But see U.S. v. Beechum, 582
F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1978), cert denied, 440 U.S. 920
(1979). See generally Sharpe, Two-Step Balancing
and the Admissibility of Other Crimes Evidence: A
Sliding Scale of Proof, 59 Notre Dame L. Rev. 556
(1984).

Several Ohio cases contain comparable language.
In State v. Eubank, 60 Ohio St.2d 183, 398 N.E.2d 567
(1979), the state argued the admissibility of evidence
of "other acts" on the theory that such evidence
showed an absence of mistake or accident. The Supreme Court held admission was error because
"[m]istake or accident was not a material issue." /d.
at 186, 398 N.E.2d at 569. See also State v. Curry, 43
Ohio St.2d 66, 73, 330 N.E.2d 720, 726 (1975) ("In the
present appeal, identity was not a material issue.").
Frequently, a stipulation will eliminate an issue
from dispute and thus preclude the need for "other
acts" evidence. See U.S. v. Mohel, 604 F.2d 748 (2d
Cir. 1979); U.S. v. De Vaughn, 601 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1979).
In order to ensure that "other acts" evidence is offered on a disputed issue, the Second Circuit has
provided some additional guidelines. If the evidence
is offered to prove that the defendant committed the
act charged, for example, by proving identity, the
"other acts" evidence may be offered during the prosecution's case-in-chief, unless the defendant's commission of the act is not a disputed issue. If the evidence is offered to prove the defendant's intent or
knowledge, the offer of similar acts evidence should
await the conclusion of the defendant's case and
should be aimed at a specifically identified issue.
U.S. v. Figueroa, 618 F.2d 934,939 (2d Cir. 1980). The
court recognized that this approach might deprive
the prosecution of necessary evidence in some
cases. Accordingly, the court suggested that the prosecution should rest its case, "reserving, out of the
presence of the jury, the right to reopen to present
such evidence in the event the defendants rest without introducing evidence." /d. at 939 n.l.

Balancing probative value against unfair prejudice
Once the relevance of "other acts" evidence is
established, the trial court must weigh its probative
value against the danger of unfair prejudice. Under
Ohio Rule 403(A), the evidence must be excluded if
the danger of unfair prejudice outweighs probative
value. The latest edition of McCormick's text describes this process in the following way:
In deciding whether the danger of unfair prejudice and
the like substantially outweighs the incremental probative value, a variety of matters must be considered, including the strength of the evidence as to the commission of the other crime, the similarities between the
crimes, the interval of time that has elapsed between the
crimes, the need tor the evidence, the efficacy of alternative proof, and the degree to which the evidence probably will rouse the jury to overmastering hostility. C.
McCormick, Evidence 565 (3d ed. 1984).

In contrast, other courts permit the prosecution
greater leeway. For example, in U.S. v. Miller, 725
F.2d 462, 466 (8th Cir. 1984), the Eight Circuit held
that where intent is an element of the crime charged,
evidence of other acts tending to establish that element is generally admissible. The prosecution need
not await the defendant's denial of intent before offering evidence of similar acts. This view unnecessarily opens the door to the admission of "other
acts" evidence. As one court has commented: "The
mere theory that a plea of not guilty puts everything
material in issue is not enough .... The prosecution
cannot credit the accused with fancy defences in
order to rebut them at the outset with some damning
piece of prejudice." Thompson v. The King, 1918
App. C. 221, 232.

Several courts require that this "balancing" process be reflected in the record. See U.S. v. Robinson,
700 F.2d 205, 213 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104
S.Ct. 1003 (1984) (Rule 404(b) requires the trial court
to make an on-the-record articulation of probative

(~ ~~~~~ _v~~~uk~~,r~h~d~~~dw5~~~ ~~ci un~~~~~gyC~ r~~~~b;)
(the trial judge must ensure that the record reflects
the consideration he made in balancing the probative value of evidence of bad acts against their preju7
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Notice
Because of the prejudice associated with "other
acts" evidence, several courts have recommended
that the prosecution give advanced notice when it intends to introduce evidence of "other acts." U.S. v.
Foskey, 636 F.2d 517,526 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Florida
Rule 404 requires written notice to defense. See also
Burks v. State, 594 P.2d 771, 774-75 (Okla. Grim. App.
1979) (ten-day pretrial written notice to defense
describing other acts with particularity; notice not required where the other acts resulted in a conviction
or is part of the res gestae); State v. Gray, 640 P.2d.
233, 236 (Mont. 1982) (prosecution must prov1de wntten notice, including a statement of purpose for
which "other acts" evidence will be offered).
The rationale for notice is clear: "The major tactical advantage accruing to the prosecution is surprise since there is no requirement that the other
crime be alleged in the pleadings and often the existence of such evidence cannot be determined
through the limited discovery available in criminal
cases." 22 C. Wright & K. Graham, Federal Practice
and Procedure 525 (1978).

CONCLUSION

As a recent review of the Federal Rules of Evidence has commented, "The use of other crimes,
acts and conduct to prove matters other than general
character has always been problematic for courts."
ABA Section on Litigation, Emerging Problems Under the Federal Rules of Evidence 65 (1983). Unfortunately, the federal drafters did not do more to
eliminate some of the problems. Thus, the courts are
now left with the responsibility of providing guidance
for the admissibility of "other acts" evidence under
Rule 404. Such guidance is solely needed; otherwise,
the shot-gun approach to this type of evidence may
continue.
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RECENT BOOKS

Several texts on criminal law, criminal procedure,
and evidence have been published recently. These
texts should be of interest to criminal litigators. Professor Lewis Katz has written a book entitled Ohio
Arrest, Search and Seizure, published by Banks Baldwin. In addition to chapters on Fourth Amendment
law it contains chapters on confessions and lineups.
Professors LaFave and Israel have published a threevolume work, entitled Criminal Procedure. This work
covers all aspects of criminal procedure, including
chapters on search and seizure, confessions, lineups, grand jury practice, pretrial release, severance
and joinder, speedy trial, discovery, and so forth.
Another book, Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses,
treats criminal defenses, including chapters on insanity, mistake, self-defense, and so forth. In addition the third edition of McCormick, Evidence has
rec~ntly been published. All three books are published by the West Publishing Company. A fourth book,
lmwinkelried, Uncharged Misconduct Evidence, is
published by Callaghan & Company.
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